e
composed of, instead of the invertebrate formation that is now
called a government, and which drifts into and creates its own
difficulties.

C. G. GORDON.

"October 19, 1882.

"_P.S._--Should Her Majesty's Government manage to arrange with
Basutos in a satisfactory manner, 10,000 splendid cavalry could
be counted on as allies in any contingencies in Natal, etc."

The vital part of Gordon's Cape experiences was the Basuto mission,
and as it is desirable that it should not be obscured by other
matters, I will only touch briefly on his work as Commandant-General,
apart from that he performed as Adviser to the Cape Government in the
Basuto difficulty. The post of Commandant-General was forced upon him
in the first weeks of his arrival from the Mauritius by the combined
urgency of Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor, and Mr Merriman, then
Premier. Much against his inclination, Gordon agreed to fill the post
thus thrust upon him, but only for a time. It entailed an infinity of
work and worry. His instructions were to break up a red-tape system,
and such a task converted every place-holder into his enemy. Still
that opposition rather made his task attractive than otherwise, but in
a little time he found that this opposition would not stop short of
insubordination, and that to achieve success it would be necessary to
cashier a good many officers as a wholesome example. It was while
matters were in this preliminary stage that Mr Merriman's ministry
went out of office, and was succeeded by another under Mr Scanlan. The
measures which were favoured by the one were opposed by the other, and
Gordon soon saw that the desire for a thorough reorganisation of the
Cape forces, which, if properly supported, he could have carried out,
was no longer prevalent among the responsible Ministers. Still he drew
up an elaborate programme for the improvement of the Colonial Regular
forces, by which they might be increased in numbers and improved in
efficiency, at the same time that the annual expenditure was reduced.
This document shows that mastery of detail which was one of his most
striking characteristics, and if his advice had been taken, the Cape
would have acquired nearly 4000 troops at no greater cost than it
already expended on 1600. In a second memorandum, he not only showed
the necessity existing for that larger force, but also how, by
administrative a