is forward vindication of
"honest gentlemen and noble ladies," who, in spite of their priests,
are still so truthful, till such time as he can find a worse
assailant of them than I am, and they no better champion of them than
himself. And as to the Priests of England, those who know them, as he
does _not_, will pronounce them no whit inferior in this great virtue
to the gentry, whom he says that he _does_; and I cannot say more.
Blot _thirty-eight_.

Lastly, this writer uses the following words, which I have more than
once quoted, and with a reference to them I shall end my remarks upon
him. "I am henceforth," he says, "in doubt and fear, as much as _an
honest man can be_, concerning every word Dr. Newman may write. How
can I tell that I shall not be the dupe of some cunning equivocation,
of one of the three kinds, laid down as permissible by the blessed
St. Alfonso da Liguori and his pupils, even when confirmed with an
oath...?"

I will tell him why he need not fear; because he has _left out_ one
very important condition in the statement of St. Alfonso--and very
applicable to my own case, even if I followed St. Alfonso's view of
the subject. St. Alfonso says "_ex justa causa_;" but our "honest
man," as he styles himself, has _omitted these words_; which are a
key to the whole question. Blot _thirty-nine_. Here endeth our
"honest man." Now for the subject of lying.

Almost all authors, Catholic and Protestant, admit, that _when a just
cause is present_, there is some kind or other of verbal misleading,
which is not sin. Even silence is in certain cases virtually such a
misleading, according to the proverb, "Silence gives consent." Again,
silence is absolutely forbidden to a Catholic, as a mortal sin, under
certain circumstances, _e.g._ to keep silence, instead of making a
profession of faith.

Another mode of verbal misleading, and the most direct, is actually
saying the thing that is not; and it is defended on the principle
that such words are not a lie, when there is a "justa causa," as
killing is not murder in the case of an executioner.

Another ground of certain authors for saying that an untruth is not a
lie where there is a just cause, is, that veracity is a kind of
justice, and therefore, when we have no duty of justice to tell truth
to another, it is no sin not to do so. Hence we may say the thing
that is not, to children, to madmen, to men who ask impertinent
questions, to those whom we hope to bene