_.

Secondly, But, if I allow of _silence_, why not of the method of
_material lying_, since half of a truth _is_ often a lie? And, again,
if all killing be not murder, nor all taking from another stealing,
why must all untruths be lies? Now I will say freely that I think it
difficult to answer this question, whether it be urged by St. Clement
or by Milton; at the same time, I never have acted, and I think, when
it came to the point, I never should act upon such a theory myself,
except in one case, stated below. This I say for the benefit of those
who speak hardly of Catholic theologians, on the ground that they
admit text-books which allow of equivocation. They are asked, how can
we trust you, when such are your views? but such views, as I already
have said, need not have anything to do with their own practice,
merely from the circumstance that they are contained in their
text-books. A theologian draws out a system; he does it partly as a
scientific speculation: but much more for the sake of others. He is
lax for the sake of others, not of himself. His own standard of
action is much higher than that which he imposes upon men in general.
One special reason why religious men, after drawing out a theory, are
unwilling to act upon it themselves, is this: that they practically
acknowledge a broad distinction between their reason and their
conscience; and that they feel the latter to be the safer guide,
though the former may be the clearer, nay even though it be the
truer. They would rather be wrong with their conscience, than right
with their reason. And again here is this more tangible difficulty in
the case of exceptions to the rule of veracity, that so very little
external help is given us in drawing the line, as to when untruths
are allowable and when not; whereas that sort of killing which is not
murder, is most definitely marked off by legal enactments, so that it
cannot possibly be mistaken for such killing as _is_ murder. On the
other hand the cases of exemption from the rule of Veracity are left
to the private judgment of the individual, and he may easily be led
on from acts which are allowable to acts which are not. Now this
remark does _not_ apply to such acts as are related in Scripture, as
being done by a particular inspiration, for in such cases there _is_
a command. If I had my own way, I would oblige society, that is, its
great men, its lawyers, its divines, its literature, publicly to
acknowledge, as such,