s, we have?' Accordingly in such
circumstances that 'No' which you utter [see Card. Pallav. lib. iii.
c. xi. n. 23, de Fide, Spe, etc.] remains deprived of its proper
meaning, and is like a piece of coin, from which by the command of
the government the current value has been withdrawn, so that by using
it you become in no sense guilty of lying."

Bolgeni says, "We have therefore proved satisfactorily, and with more
than moral certainty, that an _exception_ occurs to the general law
of not speaking untruly, viz. when it is impossible to observe a
certain other precept, more important, _without_ telling a lie. Some
persons indeed say, that in the cases of impossibility which are
above drawn out, what is said is _not_ a lie. But a man who thus
speaks confuses ideas and denies the essential characters of things.
What is a lie? It is 'locutio contra mentem;' this is its common
definition. But in the cases of impossibility, a man speaks _contra
mentem_; that is clear and evident. Therefore he tells a lie. Let us
distinguish between the lie and the sin. In the above cases, the man
really tells a lie, but this lie is not a sin, by reason of the
existing impossibility. To say that in those cases no one has a right
to ask, that the words have a meaning according to the common consent
of men, and the like, as is said by certain authors in order in those
cases to exempt the lie from sin, this is to commit oneself to
frivolous excuses, and to subject oneself to a number of retorts,
when there is the plain reason of the above-mentioned fact of
impossibility."

And the Author in the _Melanges Theologiques_: "We have then gained
this truth, and it is a conclusion of which we have not the smallest
doubt, that if the intention of deceiving our neighbour is essential
to a lie, it is allowable in certain cases to say what we know to be
false, as, _e.g._ to escape from a great danger....

"But, let no one be alarmed, it is never allowable to lie; in this we
are in perfect agreement with the whole body of theologians. The only
point in which we differ from them is in what we mean by a lie. They
call that a lie which is not such in our view, or rather, if you
will, what in our view is only a material lie they account to be both
formal and material."

Now to come to Anglican authorities.

Taylor: "Whether it can in any case be lawful to tell a lie? To this
I answer, that the holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament
do indefinitely a