ncerning what things it is suitable for the
_good of our neighbour_.... All dissimulation is not wrong, for it is
not necessary for us always openly to bring out the truth; that only
is blamed which is _malicious_.... I do not see why that cannot be
said of lying which can be said of homicide and other matters, which
are not weighed so much by the _deed_ as by _the object and end of
acting_. _What man in his senses will deny_ that there are those whom
we have the best of grounds for considering that we ought to
deceive--as boys, madmen, the sick, the intoxicated, enemies, men in
error, thieves? ...Is it a point of conscience not to deceive them?
... I would ask, by which of the commandments is a lie forbidden? You
will say, by the ninth. Come, read it out, and you will agree with
me. For whatever is here forbidden comes under the head of injuring
one's neighbour. If then any lie does _not_ injure one's neighbour,
certainly it is not forbidden by this commandment. It is on this
ground that, by the judgment of theologians, we shall acquit so many
holy men of lying. Abraham, who said to his servants that he would
return with his son; ... the wise man understood that it did not
matter to his servants to know [that his son would not return], and
that it was at the moment expedient for himself that they should not
know.... Joseph would be a man of many lies if the common definition
of lying held; [also] Moses, Rahab, Ehud, Jael, Jonathan." Here again
veracity is due only on the score of _justice_ towards the person
whom we speak with; and, if he has _no claim_ upon us to speak the
truth, we _need_ not speak the truth to him.

And so, again, Paley: "_A lie is a breach of promise_; for whoever
seriously addresses his discourse to another tacitly promises to
speak the truth, because he knows that the truth is expected. Or the
_obligation_ of veracity may be made out from the direct ill
consequences of lying to social happiness.... There are _falsehoods_
which are not _lies_; _that is, which are not criminal_." (Here, let
it be observed, is the same distinction as in Taylor between
_material_ and _formal_ untruths.) "1. When no one is deceived.... 2.
When the person to whom you speak has no _right_ to know the truth,
or, more properly, when little or no inconveniency results from the
want of confidence in such cases, as _where you tell a falsehood to a
madman_ for his own advantage; to a robber, to conceal your property;
to an a