ford, warmly contend, as if he
could not enter into any other view of the matter, that, if he had
been trusted by a friend with the secret of his being author of a
certain book, and he were asked by a third person, if his friend was
not (as he really was) the author of it, he ought without any scruple
and distinctly to answer that he did not know. He had an existing
duty towards the author; he had none towards his inquirer. The author
had a claim on him; an impertinent questioner had none at all. But
here again I desiderate some leave, recognised by society, as in the
case of the formulas "Not at home," and "Not guilty," in order to
give me the right of saying what is a _material_ untruth. And
moreover, I should here also ask the previous question, Have I any
right to accept such a confidence? have I any right to make such a
promise? and, if it be an unlawful promise, is it binding at the
expense of a lie? I am not attempting to solve these difficult
questions, but they have to be carefully examined.
As I put into print some weeks ago various extracts from authors
relating to the subject which I have been considering, I conclude by
inserting them here, though they will not have a very methodical
appearance.
For instance, St. Dorotheus: "Sometimes the _necessity_ of some
matter urges (incumbit), which, unless you somewhat conceal and
dissemble it, will turn into a greater trouble." And he goes on to
mention the case of saving a man who has committed homicide from his
pursuers: and he adds that it is not a thing that can be done often,
but once in a long time.
St. Clement in like manner speaks of it only as a necessity, and as a
necessary medicine.
Origen, after saying that God's commandment makes it a plain duty to
speak the truth, adds, that a man, "when necessity urges," may avail
himself of a lie, as medicine, that is, to the extent of Judith's
conduct towards Holofernes; and he adds that that necessity may be
the obtaining of a great good, as Jacob hindered his father from
giving the blessing to Esau against the will of God.
Cassian says, that the use of a lie, in order to be allowable, must
be like the use of hellebore, which is itself poison, unless a man
has a fatal disease on him. He adds, "Without the condition of an
extreme necessity, it is a present ruin."
St. John Chrysostom defends Jacob on the ground that his deceiving
his father was not done for the sake of temporal gain, but in order
to f
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