which says that there are untruths which are not lies.

And now as to the "just cause," which is the condition, _sine qua
non_. The Greek Fathers make them such as these, self-defence,
charity, zeal for God's honour, and the like.

St. Augustine seems to deal with the same "just causes" as the Greek
Fathers, even though he does not allow of their availableness as
depriving untruths, spoken with such objects, of their sinfulness. He
mentions defence of life and of honour, and the safe custody of a
secret. Also the Anglican writers, who have followed the Greek
Fathers, in defending untruths when there is the "just cause,"
consider that just cause to be such as the preservation of life and
property, defence of law, the good of others. Moreover, their moral
rights, _e.g._ defence against the inquisitive, etc.

St. Alfonso, I consider, would take the same view of the "justa
causa" as the Anglican divines; he speaks of it as "quicunque finis
_honestus_, ad servanda bona spiritui vel corpori utilia;" which is
very much the view which they take of it, judging by the instances
which they give.

In all cases, however, and as contemplated by all authors, Clement of
Alexandria, or Milton, or St. Alfonso, such a causa is, in fact,
extreme, rare, great, or at least special. Thus the writer in the
Melanges Theologiques (Liege, 1852-3, p. 453) quotes Lessius:
"Si absque justa causa fiat, est abusio orationis contra virtutem
veritatis, et civilem consuetudinem, etsi proprie non sit mendacium."
That is, the virtue of truth, and the civil custom, are the _measure_
of the just cause. And so Voit, "If a man has used a reservation
(restrictione non pure mentali) without a _grave_ cause, he has
sinned gravely." And so the author himself, from whom I quote,
and who defends the Patristic and Anglican doctrine that there
are untruths which are not lies, says, "Under the name of mental
reservation theologians authorise many lies, _when there is for them
a grave reason_ and proportionate," _i.e._ to their character--p.
459. And so St. Alfonso, in another treatise, quotes St. Thomas to
the effect, that, if from one cause two immediate effects follow,
and, if the good effect of that cause is _equal in value_ to the bad
effect (bonus _aequivalet_ malo), then nothing hinders that the good
may be intended and the evil permitted. From which it will follow
that, since the evil to society from lying is very great, the just
cause which is to make