iable to use words in a double sense, that is, to equivocate, I
put myself, first, under the protection of Cardinal Gerdil, who, in a
work lately published at Rome, has the following passage, which I owe
to the kindness of a friend:

Gerdil

"In an oath one ought to have respect to the intention of the party
swearing, and the intention of the party to whom the oath is taken.
Whoso swears binds himself in virtue of the words, not according to
the sense he retains in his own mind, but _in the sense according to
which he perceives that they are understood by him to whom the oath
is made_. When the mind of the one is discordant with the mind of the
other, if this happens by deceit or cheat of the party swearing, he
is bound to observe the oath according to the right sense (sana
mente) of the party receiving it; but, when the discrepancy in
the sense comes of misunderstanding, without deceit of the party
swearing, in that case he is not bound, except to that to which he
had in mind to wish to be bound. It follows hence, that _whoso uses
mental reservation or equivocation in the oath_, in order to deceive
the party to whom he offers it, _sins most grievously_, and is always
bound to observe the oath _in the sense in which he knew that his
words were_ taken by the other party, according to the decision of
St. Augustine, 'They are perjured, who, having kept the words, have
deceived the expectations of those to whom the oath was taken.' He
who swears externally, without the inward intention of swearing,
commits a most grave sin, and remains all the same under the
obligation to fulfil it.... In a word, all that is contrary to good
faith, is iniquitous, and by introducing the name of God the iniquity
is aggravated by the guilt of sacrilege."

Natalis Alexander

"They certainly lie, who utter the words of an oath, and without the
will to swear or bind themselves; or who _make use of mental
reservations and equivocations_ in swearing, since they signify by
words what they have not in mind, contrary to the end for which
language was instituted, viz. as signs of ideas. Or they mean
something else than the words signify in themselves, and the
common custom of speech, and the circumstances of persons and
business-matters; and thus they abuse words which were instituted for
the cherishing of society."

Contenson

"Hence is apparent how worthy of condemnation is the temerity of
those half-taught men, who give a colour to lies and