enai oudeis dunatai, me ouchi Theou didaxantos, toutestin,
aneu Theou me ginoskesthai ton Theon; auto de to ginoskesthai ton Theon
thelema einai tou patros, Gnosontai gar auton hois an apokalupse ho
huios].]
[Footnote 523: Iren. II. 6. 1, 9. 1, 27. 2: III. 25. 1: "Providentiam
habet deus omnium propter hoc et consilium dat: consilium autem dans
adest his, qui morum providentiam habent. Necesse est igitur ea quae
providentur et gubernantur cognoscere suum directorem; quae quidem non
sunt irrationalia neque vana, sed habent sensibilitatem perceptam de
providentia dei. Et propter hoc ethnicorum quidam, qui minus illecebris
ac voluptatibus servierunt, et non in tantum superstitione idolorum
coabducti sunt, providentia eius moti licet tenuiter, tamen conversi
sunt, ut dicererit fabricatorem huiuss universitatis patrem omnium
providentem et disponentem secundum nos mundum." Tertull., de testim.
animae; Apolog. 17.]
[Footnote 524: See Iren., IV. 6. 2; Tertull., adv. Marc. I, II.]
[Footnote 525: See Iren., V. 26. 2.]
[Footnote 526: See Iren., II. 1. I and the Hymn II. 30. 9.]
[Footnote 527: See Iren., III. 8. 3. Very pregnant are Irenaeus'
utterances in II. 34. 4 and II. 30. 9: "Principari enim debet in omnibus
et dominari voluntas dei, reliqua autem omnia huic cedere et subdita
esse et in servitium dedita" ... "substantia omnium voluntas dei;" see
also the fragment V. in Harvey, Iren., Opp. II. p. 477 sq. Because
everything originates with God and the existence of eternal metaphysical
contrasts is therefore impossible the following proposition (IV. 2, 4),
which is proved from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, holds,
good: "ex una substantia esse omnia, id est Abraham et Moysem et
prophetas, etiam ipsum dominum."]
[Footnote 528: See Iren. II. 28. 4, 5: IV. 11. 2.]
[Footnote 529: Tertullian also makes the same demand (e.g. adv. Marc.
II. 27); for his assertion "deum corpus esse" (adv. Prax. 7: "Quis enim
negabil, deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus
sui generis in sua effigie") must be compared with his realistic
doctrine of the soul (de anima 6) as well as with the proposition
formulated in de carne 11: "omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil
est incorporale, nisi quod non est." Tertullian here followed a
principle of Stoic philosophy, and in this case by no means wished to
teach that the Deity has a human form, since he recognised that man's
likeness to God consists merely
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