or to us, but are
sharing with them besides all the other blessings that belong to us the
chief magistracy also, that so they may be devoted to it as their own
possession. I am so far from assuming this to be a mistaken policy that I
say they ought all to be given a share in the government. Thus, having an
equal allotment in it, they might be faithful allies of ours, believing
that they inhabited one single city owned in common by all of us,
and this _really_ a city, and regarding fields and villages as their
individual property. But about this and what ought to be done so as not
to grant them absolutely everything, we shall reflect in greater detail
at another time.

[-20-] "It is proper to put men on the roll of the knights at eighteen
years of age; for at that period of life physical condition is at its
best and suitability of temperament can be discerned. But for the
senate they should wait till they are twenty-five years old. Is it not
disgraceful and hazardous to entrust public business to men younger than
this, when we will commit none of our private affairs to any one before,
he has reached such an age? After they have served as quaestors and
aediles, or tribunes, let them be praetors, when they have attained their
thirtieth birthday. These offices and that of consul are the only ones at
home which I maintain you ought to recognize; and that is for the sake of
remembrance of ancestral customs and in order not to seem to be changing
the constitution altogether. Do you, however, yourself choose all who are
to hold them and not put any of these offices longer in charge of the
rabble or the populace,--for they will surely quarrel,--nor in charge of
the senate, for its members will contend for the prize. Moreover, do
not keep up the ancient powers of these positions, for fear history
may repeat itself, but preserve the honor attached while abating the
influence to such an extent as will enable you to deprive each place of
none of its esteem but to forestall any desire of insubordination. This
can be done if you require the incumbents to stay in town, and do not
permit any of them to handle arms either during their period of office or
immediately afterward, but only after the lapse of some time, as much
as you think sufficient in each instance. In this way none of them will
rebel, because they become to an extent by their title masters of armies,
and their irritation will be assuaged by their faring as private citizens