per honors for their liberality. Or, if perchance there
are compulsory levies upon everybody, they endure it because they can
persuade themselves that it is wise and because they are contributing in
their own behalf. Under sovereignties they think that the ruling power
alone, to which they credit boundless wealth, should bear the expense:
they are very ready to search out the ruler's sources of income, but do
not make a similar careful calculation about the outgo. They are not
inclined to pay out anything extra personally and of their own free will,
nor will they hear of voluntary public contributions. The former course
no one would choose, because he would not readily admit that he was rich,
and it is not to the advantage of the ruler to have it happen. So liberal
a citizen would immediately acquire a reputation for patriotism among the
mass of the people, would become conceited, and cause a disturbance in
politics. On the other hand, a general levy weighs heavily upon them all
and chiefly because they endure the loss whereas others take the gain. In
democracies those who contribute money as a general rule also serve in
the army, so that in a way they get it back again. But in monarchies one
set of people usually farm, manufacture, carry on maritime enterprises,
engage in politics,--the principal pursuits by which fortunes are
secured,--and a different set are under arms and draw pay.
"This single necessity, then, which is of such importance [-7-] will
cause you trouble. Here is another. It is by all means essential that
whoever from time to time commits a crime should pay some penalty. The
majority of men are not brought to reason by suggestion or by example,
but it is absolutely requisite to punish them by disenfranchisement, by
exile, and by death; and this often happens in so great an empire and in
so large a multitude of men, especially during a change of government.
Now if you appointed other men to judge these wrongdoers, they would
acquit them speedily, particularly all whom you may be thought to hate.
For judges secure a pretended authority when they act in any way contrary
to the wish of the ruling power. If, again, any are convicted, they will
believe they have been condemned on account of instructions for which
you are responsible. However, if you sit as judge yourself, you will be
compelled to chastise many of the peers,--and this is not favorable,--and
you will certainly be thought to be setting some of th
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