, is pleasant?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word
'thirsty' implies pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the
satisfaction of the want?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: When you are thirsty?
SOCRATES: And in pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:--that pleasure and pain are
simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they
not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part,
whether of the soul or the body?--which of them is affected cannot be
supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?
CALLICLES: It is.
SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at
the same time?
CALLICLES: Yes, I did.
SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have
pleasure?
CALLICLES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the
same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the
pleasant?
CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what
a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.
SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in
drinking at the same time?
CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying.
GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;--we should like
to hear the argument out.
CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of
Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let
Socrates argue in his own fashion.
CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling
questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the
great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought
that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:--Does not a
man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same
moment?
CALLICLES: True.
SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not
cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
CALLICLES: Ver
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