better
and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And
I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an
experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure,
and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with
the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles,
not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at
random and contrary to your real opinion--for you will observe that we
are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense
at all, what question can be more serious than this?--whether he should
follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what
you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating
rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles
now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;--and
in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had
better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have
come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider
in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should
choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?

CALLICLES: No, I do not.

SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I
have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such
a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that
the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure,
is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other,
which is good--I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with me
thus far or not--do you agree?

CALLICLES: I do.

SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me,
and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to
Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and
not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to
the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of
action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure
never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she
devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or
calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just
preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when p