ore you have to say.
SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument
with Callicles, and then I might have given him an 'Amphion' in return
for his 'Zethus'; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue,
I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in
error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are
with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the
tablets of my soul.
CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.
SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:--Is the
pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed
about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good?
or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued
for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which
we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good?
To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when
some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction.
But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or
creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance
but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to
them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of
each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which
makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is
my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than
that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is
orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly.
And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles
dear; have you any?
CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow.
SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is
the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the
foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.
And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation
to the gods and to men;--for he would not be temperate if he did not?
Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he
will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is
holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very
true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty o
|