avert the
greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences be
that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his
friends?--and next will come that which is unable to avert the next
greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest
evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the
honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the
disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles?
CALLICLES: Yes, quite right.
SOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing
injustice and the suffering injustice--and we affirm that to do
injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil--by what
devices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of
not doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the
power, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man
will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have
provided himself with the power?
CALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only
sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he
have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied
and practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles,
whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the
conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong
against their will?
CALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.
SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in
order that we may do no injustice?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not
wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with
me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler
or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power.
CALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to
praise you when you talk sense.
SOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of
mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most
like to him--like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to
this?
CALLICLES: I should.
SOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected
to fea
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