ards more pleased and pained than the brave?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish
and the cowardly are the bad?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly
equal degree?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal
degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in
having more pleasure and more pain.)

CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean.

SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good
because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that
pleasures were goods and pains evils?

CALLICLES: Yes, I remember.

SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who
rejoice--if they do rejoice?

CALLICLES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with
them?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with
them?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of
the presence of evil?

CALLICLES: I should.

SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain
evil?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure
and of pain?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy
and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has
more?

CALLICLES: I should say that he has.

SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our
admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and
thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow
to be good?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?

CALLICLES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil?

CALLICLES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the
evil has more of them?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad
as the good, or, perhaps, even better?--is not this a further inference
which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the
good and the pleasant are the same:--can this be denied, Callicles?

CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admiss