ow bastions
which gave an admirable flanking fire. The wall on the western flank
was of similar construction, but had been considerably damaged at the
northern end, evidently by an explosion of gunpowder.
The weak part of our defence was on the eastern face, where the wall,
which had never been completed, was only seven feet high, and did not
extend for more than 700 yards from the south-east corner; the line
then ran to the north-west, and, skirting the village of Bimaru, ended
at the foot of the ridge.
From this description it will be seen that, though the perimeter[1]
of Sherpur was rather too large for a force of 7,000 effective men to
defend, its powers of resistance, both natural and artificial, were
considerable. It was absolutely necessary to hold the Bimaru ridge for
its entire length; to have given up any part of it would have been to
repeat the mistake which proved so disastrous to Elphinstone's army in
1841. In fact, the Bimaru heights were at once the strength and the
weakness of the position. So long as we could hold the heights we were
safe from attack from the north; but if we had been forced, either
from the weakness of our own garrison, or from any other cause, to
relinquish the command of this natural barrier, the whole of the
cantonment must have lain open to the enemy, and must forthwith have
become untenable.
The question of how Sherpur could best be defended had been carefully
considered by a committee,[2] assembled by my orders soon after
our arrival in Kabul; and a scheme had been drawn up detailing the
measures which should be adopted in case of attack.
On the recommendation of this committee six towers had been
constructed on the Bimaru heights, and shelter trenches and gunpits
made at the points where Infantry and Artillery fire could be used
with the greatest advantage. These trenches were now deepened and
prolonged, so as to form one continuous line of defence, protected by
an abattis; and the defences in the depression between the heights
were so arranged that fire could be brought to bear on an enemy
advancing from the north. To strengthen the north-east corner, a
battery was thrown up on the slope of the ridge, which was connected
with the tower above and the village below. The village itself was
loop-holed, the outlying buildings to the front made defensible,
and the open space to the north-east secured by abattis and wire
entanglements. The Native Field Hospital was strengthen
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