ng cut
off from all communication with India during the four weeks, or
thereabouts, it would take to reach Kandahar. But there was really
no alternative, for, as Major-General Phayre[4] (commanding in
Baluchistan) reported,[5] the troops available for Field Service were
but few in number, it would require at least fifteen days to equip
them, and there was no organized transport at hand, the animals having
been sent to distant grazing grounds on account of the scarcity of
water and forage.

I knew nothing as to the actual condition of the troops in
Baluchistan, except that, as belonging to the Bombay Presidency, they
could not be composed of the best fighting races, and I had a strong
feeling that it would be extremely unwise to make use of any but the
most proved Native soldiers against Ayub Khan's superior numbers,
elated as his men must be with their victory at Maiwand.

The disaster to our arms caused, as was to be expected, considerable
excitement all along the border; indeed, throughout India the
announcement produced a certain feeling of uneasiness--a mere surface
ripple--but enough to make those who remembered the days of the Mutiny
anxious for better news from the north.

To me it seemed of such supreme importance that Kandahar should be
relieved without delay, and the reverse to our arms retrieved, that
I made up my mind to communicate my views to the Viceroy through
the Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that, when he realized that a
thoroughly efficient force was ready and willing to start from Kabul,
he would no longer hesitate as to what was best to do.

On the 30th July, I dined with Stewart, and, leaving his mess-tent
at an early hour, I retired to my own quarters, and wrote out the
following telegram in cipher, but, before despatching it, I showed it
to Stewart, for, although I knew that his views were in accord with
mine, I could not with propriety have sent it without his knowledge:

'To Major-General Greaves,[6] Adjutant-General in India, Simla.

'Kabul,
'_30th July,_ 1880.

'Personal and secret. I strongly recommend that a force be sent
from this to Kandahar. Stewart has organized a very complete one
consisting of nine regiments of Infantry, three of Cavalry, and
three Mountain batteries. This will suffice to overcome all
opposition _en route_; it will have the best possible effect
on the country, and will be ready to go anywhere on reaching
Kandahar, be