despatched a
message which was more successful, and was delivered at Simla on the
30th August. It was as follows:

'KELAT-I-GHILZAI,
'_23rd August,_ 1880.

'The force under my command arrived here this morning. The
authorities at Kandahar having stated on the 17th instant that
they have abundant supplies and can make forage last until
1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest the troops, and more
especially the transport animals and camp-followers. The force
left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 136 miles during the last
eight days; the troops are in good health and spirits. From this I
purpose moving by regular-stages, so that the men may arrive fresh
at Kandahar. I hope to be in heliographic communication with
Kandahar from Robat, distant twenty miles, on the 29th. If General
Phayre reaches Takht-i-Pul, I should also hope to communicate with
him and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the
Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the Fort over to Mahomed
Sadik Khan, a Toki Chief, who had charge of the place when we
arrived in 1879; the present Governor, Sirdar Sherindil Khan,
refuses to remain. We have met with no opposition during the
march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for
supplies, especially forage, which at this season is plentiful.
The Cavalry horses and Artillery mules are in excellent order; our
casualties to date are, one soldier 72nd Highlanders, one sepoy
23rd Pioneers, one 2nd Sikhs, two sepoys 3rd Sikhs dead; one sepoy
4th Gurkhas, two sepoys 24th Punjab Native Infantry, one Duffadar
3rd Punjab Cavalry missing; six camp-followers dead, five missing.
The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. I telegraphed from
Ghazni on the 15th, and from Oba Karez on the 18th August.'

I wrote also to Major-General Phayre, telling him of the date on
which I expected to reach Kandahar, and that if I heard of his being
anywhere near I would arrange my movements to suit his, in order that
the two forces might make a combined attack on Ayub Khan's position.

As I was afraid the supplies at Kandahar would be insufficient for the
additional troops about to be collected there, I sent General Phayre
a memorandum[3] of the amount of food required daily by my force, and
begged him to get pushed up from the rear such articles as were more
particularly wanted. I pointed out that