y secure, and in front
was a network of ravines capable of being made quite impassable by
simply flooding them. It was unfortunate that the railway had been
marked out in front instead of in rear of the Takatu range, and that
its construction was too far advanced before the question of defence
came to be considered to admit of its being altered, otherwise this
position would have been a complete protection for the line of rail
also.

Having come to a definite conclusion as to the measures to be taken
for meeting the offensive and defensive requirements of Quetta and the
Bolan Pass, I turned my attention to Peshawar and the Khyber Pass,
which were infinitely more difficult to deal with, because of the
political considerations involved.

Over the whole of Baluchistan we had entire control, so that in the
event of an army moving in that direction we could depend upon the
resources of the country being at our disposal, and the people
remaining, at least, neutral. But on the Peshawar side the
circumstances were altogether different: the tribes were hostile to a
degree, and no European's life was safe across the frontier. Except in
the Khyber itself (where the policy of establishing friendly relations
with the Afridis, and utilizing them to keep open the pass, had
been most successfully practised by the political officer,
Lieutenant-Colonel Warburton), we could not depend on the tribesmen
remaining passive, much less helping us if we advanced into
Afghanistan. While, should an army attempt to invade India from that
direction, we should to a certainty have every man of the 200,000
warlike people who inhabit the mountainous district from Chitral to
Baluchistan combining against us, and pouring into India from every
outlet.

For these reasons I recorded a strong opinion in opposition to the
proposals of the Defence Committee, which were in favour of the
construction of a large magazine at Peshawar and extensive entrenched
works at the mouth of the Khyber. I pointed out the extreme danger of
a position communication with which could be cut off, and which could
be more or less easily turned, for it was clear to me that until we
had succeeded in inducing the border tribes to be on friendly terms
with us, and to believe that their interests were identical with
ours, the Peshawar valley would become untenable should any general
disturbance take place; and that, instead of entrenchments close to
the Khyber Pass, we required a pos