s thoroughly to understand and trust each other, and I felt
that I could depend upon each and all to respond heartily to whatever
call I might make upon them.

The question of supplies was my greatest anxiety, and I had many
consultations with my experienced Commissariat officer, Major Badcock,
before I could feel satisfied in this respect.

The transport, as I have already recorded, was in good order; it was
fortunate that the soldiers had been practised in loading, leading,
and tending the animals, for the Afghan drivers deserted to a man a
march or two from Kabul, and the Hazaras followed their example on
reaching their own country. Sir Donald Stewart's account of the
troubles he had encountered during his march from Kandahar was not
very encouraging, and I should have been glad if I could have taken a
larger amount of supplies;[8] but on this point I had to be guided by
the number of animals that could be allotted to the column, which was
necessarily limited, as carriage had to be provided simultaneously for
the withdrawal of the rest of the army of occupation.

The strength of the force placed at my disposal consisted of 9,986
men of all ranks and eighteen guns, divided into three brigades of
Infantry, one brigade of Cavalry, and three batteries of Mountain
Artillery. There were, besides, over 8,000 followers[9] and 2,300
horses and gun-mules.

It was designated the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force.

Major-General J. Ross, C.B., was given the command of the Infantry
division, his three Brigadier-Generals being Herbert Macpherson, T.D.
Baker, and Charles Macgregor. Brigadier-General Hugh Gough commanded
the Cavalry brigade; Colonel Alured Johnson the Artillery; while
Colonel AE. Perkins held the position of Commanding Royal Engineer;
Deputy-Surgeon-General J. Hanbury that of Principal Medical Officer;
and Lieutenant-Colonel E.F. Chapman, Chief of the Staff.

From the detail of the force given below,[10] it will be seen that
there was no wheeled Artillery, and that the number of guns was not
in proportion to the strength of the other branches. This was my own
doing; I was pressed to take more and heavier guns, but, after due
consideration, I decided that I would only have Mountain batteries. We
could not tell how long the Kandahar garrison would be able to hold
out, so that our first object must be to reach that place with the
least possible delay, and wheeled Artillery would, in a country where
there were practical