Khan.
The brigade started soon after 6 a.m. on the 27th. It was encumbered
by a large number of baggage animals, which Burrows considered could
not be left behind because of the hostile state of the country, and
the impossibility of detaching any part of his already too small force
for their protection.
At 10 a.m., when about half-way to Maiwand, a spy brought in
information that Ayub Khan had arrived at that place, and was
occupying it in force; General Burrows, however, considered it then
too late to turn back, and decided to advance. At a quarter to twelve
the forces came into collision, and the fight lasted until past three
o'clock. The Afghans, who, Burrows reported, numbered 25,000, soon
outflanked the British. Our Artillery expended their ammunition, and
the Native portion of the brigade got out of hand, and pressed back on
the few British Infantry, who were unable to hold their own against
the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Our troops were completely
routed, and had to thank the apathy of the Afghans in not following
them up for escaping total annihilation.
Of the 2,476 men engaged at Maiwand, 934 were killed and 175 were
wounded and missing;[3] the remnant struggled on throughout the night
to Kandahar, where the first of the fugitives arrived early on the
morning of the 28th. Brigadier-General Burrows, who had two horses
shot under him during the engagement, was amongst the last to reach
Kandahar.
This lamentable story imparted to me by Stewart almost took my breath
away, and we eagerly discussed the situation as we rode back together
to Sherpur. It was impossible to predict how the news would affect
the recent arrangements entered into with Abdur Rahman, or what the
attitude of the tribesmen would be; but we agreed that, whatever might
happen in our immediate neighbourhood, the only means of affording
speedy relief to the Kandahar garrison was by sending a force from
Kabul.
It soon, however, became apparent, by telegrams received from Simla,
that the Government were in doubt as to the best course to pursue, and
looked to Quetta rather than Kabul as the place from which Kandahar
could be most conveniently and rapidly succoured. This was not
altogether surprising, for the authorities naturally hesitated to
weaken Kabul until matters had been finally settled with Abdur Rahman,
and it was only to be expected that, after what had occurred at
Maiwand, they should be alarmed at the idea of a force bei
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