taken rather an unsatisfactory turn, and
the Sirdar's dealings with the leading Chiefs and tribesmen had given
cause to fear that, if he came to Kabul during our occupation, it
might be as an enemy rather than a friend.

The Mustaufi was a firm adherent of the Sher Ali faction, and, finding
there was no hope of Yakub Khan being reinstated, and that we were
negotiating with Abdur Rahman, he had espoused the cause of Yakub's
younger brother, Ayub Khan, and had been proved guilty of inciting the
Sirdars and Chiefs to oppose us. For this he was very properly sent
out of Afghanistan; nevertheless, I looked upon his removal as a
misfortune, for it broke up the only party that could possibly be
formed to counterbalance Abdur Rahman, who was astute enough to see
that the weaker our position became, the more chance there was of his
being able to get his own terms from us.

From the letters he had written to his friends and relations in
northern Afghanistan (the majority of which had fallen into our
hands), it was evident that he was doing all he could to strengthen
himself, even at our expense, and that he greatly disliked the idea of
Kandahar being separated from the kingdom of Kabul. Indeed, in one
of his communications to Mr. Griffin he had made it clear that he
expected the whole inheritance of his grandfather, Dost Mahomed Khan,
to be made over to him.

The uncertainty as to the result of the correspondence with Abdur
Rahman, the rumours in circulation regarding his real disposition and
plans, and the general excitement throughout the country, suggested
such grave doubts of the Sirdar's good faith that, in some quarters,
the question was seriously discussed whether it might not be necessary
to break off negotiations with him, and reinstate Yakub Khan, or else
set up his brother, Ayub Khan, as Amir.

I myself was altogether opposed to Yakub Khan's restoration, and as
to Ayub Khan, we were in total ignorance of his character and
proclivities, even if he had been near enough to treat with. It
appeared to me, moreover, that we had gone too far with Abdur Rahman
to throw him over because, in conformity with Afghan character and
tradition, he was not running quite straight. I, therefore, gave it as
my opinion that we should not change our tactics unless it was found
impossible to come to terms with him, or unless it was made evident on
his nearer approach to Kabul that the majority of his countrymen were
averse to have him a