ere he got possession of Herat, a consummation which was achieved only
just before his death. His successor, Sher Ali, was five years making
himself master of Afghanistan, and he could never have attained that
position but for the material assistance he received from us. I felt
it would be in the future as it had been in the past, and that there
would always be the danger of a Ruler, made supreme by the aid of our
money and our arms, turning against us for some supposed grievance, or
at the instigation of a foreign Power, as had happened with Sher Ali.
A strong, united Afghanistan was very desirable, no doubt, could we
be certain that its interests and ours would always remain identical;
but, in addition to the chance of its strength and unity being used
against us, there was the certainty that, even if the man we might
choose as Amir were to remain perfectly loyal, at his death Afghan
history would repeat itself; the succession to the throne would be
disputed, and the unification would have to begin all over again. For
these reasons I had no hesitation in giving it as my opinion that
Afghanistan should be disintegrated, and that we should not again
attempt to place the whole country under any one Sovereign.

My views must have commended themselves to the Government of India,
for in their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 7th January,
1880, they indicated them as the line of policy they proposed to adopt
in pursuance of the object they had at heart, viz., the safety of the
Indian Empire and the tranquillity of its northern frontier; and in
the communication to myself, conveying their idea of the general
principles upon which the permanent settlement of Afghanistan should
be based, the Foreign Secretary wrote that all arrangements for
the establishment of a durable Government at Kabul depended on the
selection of a suitable Ruler for that province; and that, as it was
essential to clear away any apprehension that the British Government
contemplated territorial annexation, which might be caused by a
prolonged interregnum, it would be very advantageous if one of the
principal Sirdars, qualified by his family connexions, his local
influence, and his personal following, could be selected as the Ruler
of the Kabul State.

There was another very strong reason why the Government of India
should wish to find some one to whom the administration of the country
could safely be made over. The first warning notes of a Gener