could be trusted,
however profuse he might be in his assurances of fidelity, and that we
must depend entirely on our own resources for intelligence.

I waited at Deh-i-Mazang until Macpherson arrived, and thus did not
get back to Sherpur till after dark. I was gratified on my arrival
there to find that Hugh Gough had made every arrangement that could be
desired for the defence of the cantonment, and that by his own
cool and confident bearing he had kept the troops calm and steady,
notwithstanding the untoward appearance of some fugitives from the
field of battle, whose only too evident state of alarm might otherwise
have caused a panic.

For the safety of Sherpur I never for one moment had the smallest
apprehension during that eventful day. It was, I believe, thought by
some that if Mahomed Jan, instead of trying for the city, had made for
the cantonment, it would have fallen into his hands; but they were
altogether wrong, for there were a sufficient number of men within the
walls to have prevented such a catastrophe had Mahomed Jan been in
a position to make an attack; but this, with Macpherson's brigade
immediately in his rear, he could never have dreamt of attempting.

The city of Kabul remained perfectly quiet while all the excitement
I have described was going on outside. Hills, with a few Sikhs,
patrolled the principal streets, and even when the Afghan standard
appeared on the Takht-i-Shah there was no sign of disturbance.
Nevertheless, I thought it would be wise to withdraw from the city;
I could not tell how long the people would remain well disposed,
or whether they would assist us to keep the enemy out. I therefore
directed Hills to come away and make over his charge to an influential
Kizilbash named Futteh Khan. I also telegraphed to General Bright at
Jalalabad to reinforce Gandamak by a sufficient number of troops
to hold that post in case it should be necessary to order
Brigadier-General Charles Gough, who was then occupying it, to move
his brigade nearer to Kabul; for I felt sure that, unless I could
succeed in driving Mahomed Jan out of the neighbourhood of Kabul,
excitement would certainly spread along my line of communication.
I concluded my message to Bright thus: 'If the wire should be cut,
consider it a bad sign, and push on to Gandamak, sending Gough's
Brigade towards Kabul.'

I could not help feeling somewhat depressed at the turn things had
taken. I had no news from Baker, and we had undoubte