ents
to avoid some of the social difficulties encountered in rest
areas.[2-108]
[Footnote 2-107: The percentage of high school
graduates and men scoring in AGCT categories I, II,
and III among the black infantry volunteers was
somewhat higher than that of all Negroes in the
European theater. As against 22 percent high school
graduates and 29 percent in the first three test
score categories for the volunteers, the
percentages for all Negroes in the theater were 18
and 17 percent. At the same time the averages for
black volunteers were considerably below those for
white riflemen, of whom 41 percent were high school
graduates and 71 percent in the higher test
categories--figures that tend to refute the
general's argument. See ASF I&E Div Rpt B-157, 3
Jul 45.]
[Footnote 2-108: Msg, Hq ComZ, ETO, Paris, France
(signed Bradley), to WD 3 Jul 45. For similar
reports from the field see, for example, Ltr, Brig
Gen R. B. Lovett, ETO AG, to TAG, 7 Sep 45, sub:
The Utilization of Negro Platoons in White
Companies; Ltr, Hq USFET to TAG, 24 Oct 45, same
sub. Both in AG 291.2 (1945).]
General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, agreed with both Somervell and
Bradley. Although he thought that the possibility of integrating black
units into white units should be "followed up," he believed that the
survey should not be made public because "the conditions under which
the [black] platoons were organized and employed were most
unusual."[2-109] Too many of the circumstances of the experiment were
special--the voluntary recruitment of men for frontline duty, the
relatively high number of noncommissioned officers among the
volunteers, and the fact that the volunteers were slightly older and
scored higher in achievement tests than the average black soldier.
Moreover, throughout the experiment some degree of segregation, with
all its attendant psychological and morale problems, had been
maintained.
[Footnote 2-109: Memo, CofS for ASW, 25 Aug 45, WDCSA
291.2 Negroes (25 Aug 45).]
The platoon e
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