and her
unbending insistence on equal treatment for the achievement.
Forrestal won the day in these early experiments, but he was a
skillful administrator and knew that there was little hope for any
fundamental social change in the naval service without the active
cooperation of the Navy's high-ranking officers. His meeting with
Admiral King on the subject of integration in the summer of 1944 has
been reported by several people. Lester Granger, who later became
Forrestal's special representative on racial matters, recalled:
He [Forrestal] said he spoke to Admiral King, who was then chief
of staff, and said, "Admiral King, I'm not satisfied with the
situation here--I don't think that our Navy Negro personnel are
getting a square break. I want to do something about it, but I
can't do anything about it unless the officers are behind me. I
want your help. What do you say?"
He said that Admiral King sat for a moment, and looked out (p. 089)
the window and then said reflectively, "You know, we say that
we are a democracy and a democracy ought to have a democratic
Navy. I don't think you can do it, but if you want to try, I'm
behind you all the way." And he told me, "And Admiral King was
behind me, all the way, not only he but all of the Bureau of
Personnel, BuPers. They've been bricks."[3-105]
[Footnote 3-105: Quoted in the Columbia University
Oral History Interview with Granger. Granger's
incorrect reference to Admiral King as "chief of
staff" is interesting because it illustrates the
continuing evolution of that office during World
War II.]
[Illustration: SAILORS IN THE GENERAL SERVICE MOVE AMMUNITION.]
Admiral Jacobs, the Chief of Naval Personnel, also pledged his
support.[3-106]
[Footnote 3-106: James V. Forrestal, "Remarks for
Dinner Meeting at National Urban League," 12 Feb
58, Box 31, Misc file, Forrestal Papers, Princeton
Library. Forrestal's truncated version of the King
meeting agreed substantially with Granger's
lengthier remembrance.]
As news of the King-Forrestal conversation filtered through the
department, many of the programs long suggested by the Special
Programs Unit and heretofore treated with indif
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