mander of the Pacific Fleet and an eloquent proponent of
the theory that integration was a practical means of avoiding trouble,
explained to the captain of an attack cargo ship who had just received
a group of black crewmen and was segregating their sleeping quarters:
"If you put all the Negroes together they'll have a chance to share
grievances and to plot among themselves, and this will damage
discipline and morale. If they are distributed among other members of
the crew, there will be less chance of trouble. And when we say we
want integration, we mean _integration_."[3-122] Thus integration grew
out of both idealism and realism.

[Footnote 3-122: As quoted in White, _A Man Called
White_, p. 273. For a variation on this theme, see
Interv, Nichols with Hillenkoetter.]

If racial incidents convinced the admirals that further reforms were
necessary, they also seem to have strengthened Forrestal's resolve to
introduce a still greater change in his department's policy. For
months he had listened to the arguments of senior officials and naval
experts that integration of the fleet, though desirable, was
impossible during the war. Yet Forrestal had seen integration work on
the small patrol craft, on fleet auxiliaries, and in the WAVES. In
fact, integration was working smoothly wherever it had been tried.
Although hard to substantiate, the evidence suggests that it was in
the weeks after the Guam incident that the secretary and Admiral King
agreed on a policy of total integration in the general service. The
change would be gradual, but the progress would be evident and the end
assured--Negroes were going to be assigned as individuals to all
branches and billets in the general service.[3-123]

[Footnote 3-123: Ltr, Rear Adm Hillenkoetter to
Nichols, 22 May 53; see also Intervs, Nichols with
Granger, Hillenkoetter, Jacobs, Thomas Darden,
Dillon, and other BuPers officials. In contrast to
the Knox period, where the files are replete with
Secretary of the Navy memos, BuPers letters, and
General Board reports on the development of the
Navy's racial policy, there is scant documentation
on the same subject during the early months of the
Forrestal administration. This is understandable