FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207  
208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   >>   >|  
prewar studies by the General Staff, the Army War College, and other military agencies, the Army was unprepared during World War II to deal with and make the most efficient use of the large numbers of Negroes furnished by Selective Service. Policies for training and employing black troops had developed in response to specific problems rather than in accordance with a well thought out and comprehensive plan. Because of "inadequate preparation prior to the period of sudden expansion," McCloy believed a great many sources of racial irritation persisted. To develop a "definite, workable policy, for the inclusion and utilization in the Army of minority racial groups" before postwar planning crystallized and solidified, McCloy suggested to his assistants that the War Department General Staff review existing practices and experiences at home and abroad and recommend changes.[5-20] [Footnote 5-20: Memos, McCloy for Advisory Committee on Special Troop Policies, 31 Jul and 1 Sep 44, sub: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment; Memo, ASW for SW, 10 Jan 45, same sub, all in ASW 291.2 (NT).] The Chief of Staff, General Marshall, continued to insist that the Army's racial problem was but part of a larger national problem and, as McCloy later recalled, had no strong views on a solution.[5-21] Whatever his personal feelings, Marshall, like most Army staff officers, always emphasized efficiency and performance to the exclusion of social concerns. While he believed that the limited scope of the experiment with integrated platoons toward the end of the war in Europe made the results inconclusive, Marshall still wanted the platoons' performance considered in the general staff study.[5-22] [Footnote 5-21: Ltr, John J. McCloy to author, 18 Sep 69, CMH files.] [Footnote 5-22: Memo, CofS for McCloy, 25 Aug 45, WDCSA 291.2 Negroes (25 Aug 45).] The idea of a staff study on the postwar use of black troops also found favor with Secretary Stimson, and a series of conferences and informal discussions on the best way to go about it took place in the highest echelons of the Army during the early months of 1945. The upshot was a decision to ask the senior commanders at home and overseas for their comments. How did they train and use their black
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207  
208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

McCloy

 

Footnote

 

Marshall

 
racial
 

General

 
platoons
 

believed

 

performance

 
postwar
 
problem

troops

 

Negroes

 
Policies
 
national
 
solution
 

limited

 

integrated

 

strong

 

experiment

 
larger

social

 
Whatever
 

recalled

 

officers

 

personal

 

feelings

 
emphasized
 
exclusion
 

efficiency

 

concerns


inconclusive

 

overseas

 

discussions

 

informal

 

Secretary

 

Stimson

 

series

 
conferences
 

senior

 

upshot


months
 

commanders

 
highest
 
echelons
 
wanted
 

considered

 

general

 
decision
 
results
 

Europe