the primary cause of the Navy's racial problems was segregation.
Segregation was "impractical and inefficient," he pointed out, because
racial isolation bred suspicion, which in turn inflamed resentment,
and finally provoked insubordination. The best way to integrate
Negroes, Granger felt, was to take the most natural course, that is,
eliminate all special provisions, conditions, or cautions regarding
their employment. "There should be no exceptional approach to problems
involving Negroes," he counseled, "for the racial factor in naval
service will disappear only when problems involving Negroes are
accepted as part of the Navy's general program for insuring efficient
performance and first-class discipline."

Despite his earlier insistence on a fair percentage of Negroes in the
postwar Regular Navy, Granger conceded that the number and proportion
would probably decrease during peacetime. It was hardly likely, he
added, that black enlistment would exceed 5 percent of the total
strength, a manageable proportion. He even saw some advantages in
smaller numbers, since, as the educational standards for all enlistees
rose, the integration of relatively few but better qualified Negroes
would "undoubtedly make for greater racial harmony and improved naval
performance."

Despite the breadth and acuity of his observations, Granger suggested
remarkedly few changes. Impressed by the progress made in the
treatment of Negroes during the war, he apparently expected it to
continue uninterrupted. Although his investigations uncovered basic
problems that would continue to trouble the Navy, he did not (p. 151)
recognize them as such. For his part, Forrestal sent Granger's
voluminous reports with their few recommendations to his military
staff and thanked the Urban League official for his contribution.[5-63]

[Footnote 5-63: Memo, J.F. [James Forrestal] for Vice
Adm Jacobs (Chief of Naval Personnel), 23 Aug 45;
Ltr, SecNav to Granger, 29 Dec 45, both in 54-1-13,
Forrestal file, GenRecsNav.]

Although different in approach and point of view, Granger's
observations neatly complemented the findings and recommendations of
the Committee on Negro Personnel. Both reinforced the secretary's
postwar policy aims and both supported his gradualist approach to
racial reform. Granger cited segregation, in particular the
concentration of masses of black sailors, as the p