war.
[Illustration: GRANGER WITH CREWMEN OF A NAVAL YARD CRAFT.]
To document the status of the Negro in the Navy, Forrestal turned
again to Lester Granger. Granger had acted more than once as the
secretary's eyes and ears on racial matters, and the association
between the two men had ripened from mutual respect to close
rapport.[5-61] During August 1945 Granger visited some twenty
continental installations for Forrestal, including large depots and
naval stations on the west coast, the Great Lakes Training Center, and
bases and air stations in the south. Shortly after V-J day Granger
launched a more ambitious tour of inspection that found him traveling
among the 45,000 Negroes assigned to the Pacific area.
[Footnote 5-61: Columbia University Oral Hist Interv
with Granger.]
Unlike the Army staff, whose worldwide quest for information stressed
black performance in the familiar lessons-learned formula and only
incidentally treated those factors that affected performance, Granger,
a civilian, never really tried to assess performance. He was, (p. 148)
however, a race relations expert, and he tried constantly to discover
how the treatment accorded Negroes in the Navy affected their
performance and to pass on his findings to local commanders. He later
explained his technique. First, he called on the commanding officer
for facts and opinions on the performance and morale of the black
servicemen. Then he proceeded through the command, unaccompanied,
interviewing Negroes individually as well as in small and large
groups. Finally, he returned to the commanding officer to pass along
grievances reported by the men and his own observations on the
conditions under which they served.[5-62]
[Footnote 5-62: Granger's findings and an account of
his inspection technique are located in Ltrs,
Granger to SecNav, 4 Aug, 10 Aug, 27 Aug, and 31
Oct 45; and in "Minutes of Press Conference Held by
Mr. Lester B. Granger," 1 Nov 45. All in 54-1-13,
Forrestal file, GenRecsNav. See also Columbia
University Oral Hist Interv with Granger.]
Granger always related the performance of enlisted men to their
morale. He pointed out to the commanders that poor morale was at the
bottom of the Port Chicago mass mutiny and the Guam riot, and his
report to the secretary confirmed
|