and
social activities conform to the custom of the surrounding community.
It wanted Negroes assigned overseas in the same proportion as whites,
and in the United States, to the extent practicable, only to those
areas considered favorable to their welfare. Finally, the Air Forces
wanted Negroes to be neither favored nor discriminated against in
disciplinary matters.[5-47]

[Footnote 5-47: Memo, CG, AAF, for CofSA, 17 Sep 45,
sub: Participation of Negro Troops in the Postwar
Military Establishment, WDSSP 291.2 (1945). For the
final report of 2 Oct 45, which summed up the
previous recommendations, see Summary Sheet,
AC/AS-1 for Maj Gen C. C. Chauncey, DCofAS, 2 Oct
45, same sub and file.]

Among the responses of the subordinate commands were some exceptions
to the generalizations found in those of the major forces. One
commander, for example, while concluding that segregation was
desirable, admitted that it was one of the basic causes of the Army's
racial troubles and would have to be dealt with "one way or the
other."[5-48] Another recommended dispersing black troops, one or two in
a squad, throughout all-white combat units.[5-49] Still another pointed
out that the performance of black officers and noncommissioned
officers in terms of resourcefulness, aggressiveness, sense of
responsibility, and ability to make decisions was comparable to the
performance of white soldiers when conditions of service were nearly
equal. But the Army failed to understand this truth, the commander of
the 1st Service Command charged, and its separate and unequal
treatment discriminated in a way that would affect the efficiency of
any man. The performance of black troops, he concluded, depended on
how severely the community near a post differentiated between the
black and white soldier and how well the Negro's commander
demonstrated the fairness essential to authority. The Army admitted
that black units needed superior leadership, but, he added, it
misunderstood what this leadership entailed. All too often commanders
of black units acted under the belief that their men were different
and needed special treatment, thus clearly suggesting racial
inferiority. The Army, he concluded, should learn from its wartime
experience the deleterious effect of segregation on motivation and
ultimately on performance.[5-50]