notable example
of the wholesale conversion of such combat troops and one that
received considerable notice in the press was the inactivation of the
2d Cavalry Division upon its arrival in North Africa in March 1944.
Victims of the change included the 9th and 10th Cavalry regiments,
historic combat units that had fought with distinction in the Indian
wars, with Teddy Roosevelt in Cuba, and in the Philippine
Insurrection.[2-38]

[Footnote 2-38: Inactivation of the 2d Cavalry
Division began in February 1944, and its
headquarters completed the process on 10 May. The
9th Cavalry was inactivated on 7 March, the 10th
Cavalry on 20 March 1944.]

By trying to justify the conversion, Secretary Stimson only aggravated
the controversy. In the face of congressional questions and criticism
in the black press, Stimson declared that the decision stemmed from a
study of the relative abilities and status of training of the troops
in the units available for conversion. If black units were
particularly affected, it was because "many of the Negro units have
been unable to master efficiently the techniques of modern
weapons."[2-39] Thus, by the end of 1944, the Army had abandoned its
attempt to maintain a balance between black combat and service units,
and during the rest of the war most Negroes were assigned to service
units.

[Footnote 2-39: Ltr, SW to Rep. Hamilton Fish, 19 Feb
44, reprinted in U.S. Congress, House,
_Congressional Record_, 78th Cong., 2d sess., pp.
2007-08.]

According to the War Department, the relationship between Negroes (p. 034)
and the Army was a mutual obligation. Negroes had the right and duty
to serve their country to the best of their abilities; the Army had
the right and the duty to see that they did so. True, the use of black
troops was made difficult because their schooling had been largely
inferior and their work therefore chiefly unskilled. Nevertheless, the
Army staff concluded, all races were equally endowed for war and most
of the less mentally alert could fight if properly led.[2-40] A manual
on leadership observed:

War Department concern with the Negro is focused directly and
solely on the problem of the most effective use of colored troops
... the Army has no authority or intention to participate in
soc