resolution purports to
recommend.[2-73]

[Footnote 2-72: Min of Mtg of Advisory Cmte on Negro
Troop Policies, 29 Feb 44, ASW 291.2 Negro Troops
Cmte; Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, pp.
449-50.]

[Footnote 2-73: Memo, ASW for SW, 2 Mar 44, inclosing
formal recommendations, WDCSA 291.2/13 Negroes
(1944).]

Stimson agreed, and on 4 March 1944 the Advisory Committee met with
members of the Army staff to decide on combat assignments for
regimental combat teams from the 92d and 93d Divisions. In order that
both handpicked soldiers and normal units might be tested, the team
from the 93d would come from existing units of that division, and the
one from the 92d would be a specially selected group of volunteers.
General Marshall and his associates continued to view the commitment
of black combat troops as an experiment that might provide
documentation for the future employment of Negroes in combat.[2-74] In
keeping with this experiment, the Army staff suggested to field
commanders how Negroes might be employed and requested continuing
reports on the units' progress.

[Footnote 2-74: Pogue, _Organizer of Victory_, p.
99.]

The belated introduction of major black units into combat helped
alleviate the Army's racial problems. After elements of the 93d
Division were committed on Bougainville in March 1944 and an advanced
group of the 92d landed in Italy in July, the Army staff found it
easier to ship smaller supporting units to combat theaters, either as
separate units or as support for larger units, a course that reduced
the glut of black soldiers stationed in the United States. Recognizing
that many of these units had poor leaders, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair,
head of the Army Ground Forces, ordered that, "if practicable," all
leaders of black units who had not received "excellent" or higher (p. 044)
in their efficiency ratings would be replaced before the units were
scheduled for overseas deployment.[2-75] Given the "if practicable"
loophole, there was little chance that all the units would go overseas
with "excellent" commanders.

[Footnote 2-75: Memo, CG, AGF, for CG's, Second Army,
et al., n.d., sub: Efficiency Ratings of Commanders
of Negro Units Scheduled for Overseas Shipment,