Neither can one while remaining one be other than other;
for other, and not one, is the other than other. But if not other by
virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue
of itself, not itself other, and if not itself other, not other than
anything. Neither will one be the same with itself. For the nature of
the same is not that of the one, but a thing which becomes the same with
anything does not become one; for example, that which becomes the same
with the many becomes many and not one. And therefore if the one is the
same with itself, the one is not one with itself; and therefore one and
not one. And therefore one is neither other than other, nor the same
with itself. Neither will the one be like or unlike itself or other;
for likeness is sameness of affections, and the one and the same are
different. And one having any affection which is other than being one
would be more than one. The one, then, cannot have the same affection
with and therefore cannot be like itself or other; nor can the one
have any other affection than its own, that is, be unlike itself or any
other, for this would imply that it was more than one. The one, then,
is neither like nor unlike itself or other. This being the case, neither
can the one be equal or unequal to itself or other. For equality implies
sameness of measure, as inequality implies a greater or less number
of measures. But the one, not having sameness, cannot have sameness of
measure; nor a greater or less number of measures, for that would imply
parts and multitude. Once more, can one be older or younger than itself
or other? or of the same age with itself or other? That would imply
likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality. Therefore one cannot
be in time, because that which is in time is ever becoming older and
younger than itself, (for older and younger are relative terms, and he
who becomes older becomes younger,) and is also of the same age with
itself. None of which, or any other expressions of time, whether past,
future, or present, can be affirmed of one. One neither is, has been,
nor will be, nor becomes, nor has, nor will become. And, as these are
the only modes of being, one is not, and is not one. But to that which
is not, there is no attribute or relative, neither name nor word nor
idea nor science nor perception nor opinion appertaining. One, then, is
neither named, nor uttered, nor known, nor perceived, nor imagined. But
can all this be
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