gally
be constrained to follow, to institute, or to support, against his
will, any religious cult or ministry. In no case may any human
authority interfere in questions of conscience and control the
prerogatives of the soul._

_Constitution of New Hampshire, articles 5 and 6_: _Among the number
of natural rights, some are inalienable by their nature, because
nothing can take their place. Such are the rights of conscience._

The incompatibility of religion with the rights of man is thus not
implied by the conception of the rights of man, because the right to
be religious, to be religious according to one's liking, to practise
the cult of a particular religion, is expressly included among the
rights of man. The privilege of faith is a general right of man.

The rights of man as such are distinguished from the rights of the
citizen. What is man apart from the citizen? Nothing else than a
member of bourgeois society. Why is the member of bourgeois society
called "man," and why are his rights called the rights of man? How do
we explain this fact? From the relation of the political State to
bourgeois society, from the meaning of political emancipation.

Above all we must record the fact that the so-called rights of man, as
distinguished from the rights of the citizen, are nothing else than
the rights of the member of bourgeois society, that is of the egoistic
individual, of man separated from man and the community. The most
radical constitution, the Constitution of 1793, may be cited:

_Declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen. Article 2. These
rights, etc. (natural and imprescriptible rights) are: equality,
liberty, security, property._

Of what consists liberty? _Article 6. Liberty is the power which
belongs to man to do everything which does not injure the rights of
others._

Freedom is therefore the right to do and perform that which injures
none. The limits within which each may move without injuring others
are fixed by the law, as the boundary between two fields is fixed by
the fence. The freedom in question is the freedom of the individual as
an isolated atom thrown back upon itself. Why, according to Bauer, is
the Jew incapable of receiving the rights of man? "So long as he is a
Jew, the limiting quality which makes him a Jew must triumph over the
human quality which binds him as a man to other men, and must separate
him from gentiles." But the right of man to freedom is not based upon
the connecti