portunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come. Not only
is it Japan's divine duty to act now, but present conditions in
China favour the execution of such a plan. We should by all means
decide and act at once. If our authorities do not avail themselves
of this rare opportunity, great difficulty will surely be
encountered in future in the settlement of this Chinese Question.
Japan will be isolated from the European Powers after the war, and
will be regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is
now regarded. Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at
this very moment the Chinese Question?

No one--not even those who care nothing for politics--can deny that
there is in this document an astounding disclosure of the mental
attitude of the Japanese not only towards their enemies but towards
their friends as well. They trust nobody, befriend nobody, envy nobody;
they content themselves with believing that the whole world may in the
not distant future turn against them. The burden of their argument
swings just as much against their British ally as against Germany and
Austria; and the one and only matter which preoccupies Japanese who make
it their business to think about such things is to secure that Japan
shall forestall Europe in seizing control of China. It is admitted in so
many words that it is too early to know who is to triumph in the
gigantic European struggle; it is also admitted that Germany will
forever be the enemy. At the same time it is expected, should the issue
of the struggle be clear-cut and decisive in favour of the Allies, that
a new three-Power combination formed by England, France and Russia may
be made to operate against Japan. Although the alliance with England,
twice renewed since 1902, should occupy as important a place in the Far
East as the _Entente_ between England and France occupies in Europe, not
one Japanese in a hundred knows or cares anything about such an
arrangement; and even if he has knowledge of it, he coolly assigns to
his country's major international commitment a minimum and constantly
diminishing importance. In his view the British Alliance is nothing but
a piece of paper which may be consumed in the great bonfire now shedding
such a lurid light over the world. What is germane to the matter is his
own plan, his own method of taking up arms in a sea of troubles. The
second part of the Black Dragon Society's Memorandum