of their desire to push
home the attack to the last gasp and so to secure the infeodation of
China.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MONARCHIST PLOT

THE PAMPHLET OF YANG TU

A shiver of impotent rage passed over the country when the nature and
acceptance of the Japanese Ultimatum became generally known. The
Chinese, always an emotional people, responding with quasi-feminine
volubility to oppressive acts, cried aloud at the ignominy of the
diplomacy which had so cruelly crucified them. One and all declared that
the day of shame which had been so harshly imposed upon them would never
be forgotten and that Japan would indeed pay bitterly for her policy of
extortion.

Two movements were started at once: one to raise a National Salvation
Fund to be applied towards strengthening the nation in any way the
government might decide; the other, to boycott all Japanese articles of
commerce. Both soon attained formidable proportions. The nation became
deeply and fervently interested in the double-idea; and had Yuan
Shih-kai possessed true political vision there is little doubt that by
responding to this national call he might have ultimately been borne to
the highest pinnacles of his ambitions without effort on his part. His
oldest enemies now openly declared that henceforth he had only to work
honourably and whole-heartedly in the nation's interest to find them
supporting him, and to have every black mark set against his name wiped
out.

In these circumstances what did he do? His actions form one of the most
incredible and, let it be said, contemptible chapters of contemporary
history.

In dealing with the origins of the Twenty-one Demands we have already
discussed the hints the Japan Representative had officially made when
presenting his now famous Memorandum. Briefly Yuan Shih-kai had been
told in so many words that since he was already autocrat of all the
Chinese, he had only to endorse the principle of Japanese guidance in
his administration to find that his Throne would be as good as publicly
and solidly established. Being saturated with the doleful diplomacy of
Korea, and seeing in these proposals a mere trap, Yuan Shih-kai, as we
have shown, had drawn back in apparent alarm. Nevertheless the words
spoken had sunk in deep, for the simple and excellent reason that ever
since the _coup d'etat_ of the 4th November, 1913, the necessity of
"consolidating" his position by something more permanent than a display
of armed force