rthy of
belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for their pains,
I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my tongue when the
state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can speak with more
authority on the matter than other persons. Much as you wonder at it,
the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with a large force,
naval and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans and to restore
Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above all our city, which
once gained, the rest, they think, will easily follow. Make up your
minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and see how you can best
repel them with the means under your hand, and do be taken off your
guard through despising the news, or neglect the common weal through
disbelieving it. Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at
the force or daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more
hurt than we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament
altogether without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the
better, with regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make
more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed
of the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that
they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit for
us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed have been
the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have gone far
from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous than the
people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom fear leagues
together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in a foreign land,
to those against whom their plans were laid none the less they leave
renown, although they may themselves have been the main cause of their
own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose by the defeat of the
Mede, in a great measure due to accidental causes, from the mere fact
that Athens had been the object of his attack; and this may very well be
the case with us also.
"Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send and
confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance
of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the
danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies,
or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also think that
it would be best to send to Carthage as well; th
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