ught that the fortification of this place would make it easier to
bring in supplies, as they would be able to carry on their blockade from
a less distance, near to the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead
of being obliged, upon every movement of the enemy's navy, to put out
against them from the bottom of the great harbour. Besides this, he now
began to pay more attention to the war by sea, seeing that the coming
of Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land. Accordingly, he conveyed
over his ships and some troops, and built three forts in which he placed
most of his baggage, and moored there for the future the larger craft
and men-of-war. This was the first and chief occasion of the losses
which the crews experienced. The water which they used was scarce
and had to be fetched from far, and the sailors could not go out for
firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse, who were masters
of the country; a third of the enemy's cavalry being stationed at the
little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering incursions on the part
of the Athenians at Plemmyrium. Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest
of the Corinthian fleet was approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch
for them, with orders to be on the look-out for them about Locris and
Rhegium and the approach to Sicily.

Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using the
stones which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and at the
same time constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies, and formed
them in order of battle in front of the lines, the Athenians forming
against him. At last he thought that the moment was come, and began the
attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued between the lines, where the
Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; and the Syracusans and their
allies were defeated and took up their dead under truce, while the
Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus called the soldiers
together, and said that the fault was not theirs but his; he had kept
their lines too much within the works, and had thus deprived them of
the services of their cavalry and darters. He would now, therefore, lead
them on a second time. He begged them to remember that in material force
they would be fully a match for their opponents, while, with respect
to moral advantages, it were intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians
should not feel confident of overcoming Ionians and islanders with the
motley rabble that accompanied them, a