ly incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they were
in a critical position, and that, unless speedily recalled or strongly
reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He feared, however,
that the messengers, either through inability to speak, or through
failure of memory, or from a wish to please the multitude, might not
report the truth, and so thought it best to write a letter, to ensure
that the Athenians should know his own opinion without its being lost in
transmission, and be able to decide upon the real facts of the case.

His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite
verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the army, making
it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid any unnecessary
danger.

At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched
in concert with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against
Amphipolis, and failing to take it brought some galleys round into
the Strymon, and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at
Himeraeum.

Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias,
reaching Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted to
them, and answered any questions that were asked them, and delivered
the letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and read out to the
Athenians the letter, which was as follows:

"Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many
other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar with
our present condition, and to take your measures accordingly. We had
defeated in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans, against
whom we were sent, and we had built the works which we now occupy, when
Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained from Peloponnese
and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first battle with him we
were victorious; in the battle on the following day we were overpowered
by a multitude of cavalry and darters, and compelled to retire within
our lines. We have now, therefore, been forced by the numbers of those
opposed to us to discontinue the work of circumvallation, and to remain
inactive; being unable to make use even of all the force we have, since
a large portion of our heavy infantry is absorbed in the defence of our
lines. Meanwhile the enemy have carried a single wall past our lines,
thus making it impossible for us to invest them in future, until this
cross wall b