he expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the
whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require
them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that they had asked for,
to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines either
by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other cities, and
after displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal for their
friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should have some
sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or of
bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state
by wasting its home resources.

Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not
disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds must
be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts
be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and to
obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and troops; and
first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the passage and
entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and base for
the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who would
be their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse and
Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former
ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.

Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to
Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town
while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its height.
Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on
without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they saw it appear
at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse
still trembled at their coming, they would have the best chance of
gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic into
the enemy by the aspect of their numbers--which would never appear so
considerable as at present--by the anticipation of coming disaster, and
above all by the immediate danger of the engagement. They might also
count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their
coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property
the army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the
city. The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less
disposed to enter into all