ey are by no means there
without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that the Athenians
may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think that they
might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and be willing
to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in another. They
are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the present day, as
they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like everything else,
flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to
come here and help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in
Hellas. But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the
present moment, is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet,
will be slow to see, and what I must nevertheless mention. If we
Siceliots, all together, or at least as many as possible besides
ourselves, would only launch the whole of our actual navy with two
months' provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian
promontory, and show them that before fighting for Sicily they must
first fight for their passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike
dismay into their army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for
our defensive--for Tarentum is ready to receive us--while they have a
wide sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty
keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to
attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand,
if they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast
sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them when
they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we
could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few provisions
just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places, and
would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along
the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being further
discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities would receive
them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be sufficient to
deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what with deliberating and
reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, they would let the season
go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected a
circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially as their most
experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against hi