rom the officer left in command at Molteno that he did
not know the route by which the main column was advancing.

[Sidenote: The guides miss the road.]

Meanwhile, the infantry of that column had pressed on with the
keenness of soldiers eager for their first fight, and at 1 a.m. a
homestead, which proved to be that of Mr. J. Roberts. The guides had
in fact passed the branch road leading to Van Zyl's farm, but on being
interrogated, the head guide, Sergeant Morgan, assured Sir W. Gatacre
that he and his assistants knew the way perfectly, and that they were
leading the column by a road which, though slightly longer than that
originally selected, avoided wire and a bad piece of track which the
guns would have found it difficult to cross at night. They added that
they were within one and a half miles of the spot, to which the
General desired to be guided. The map and freehand sketch show that
the guides now proposed to lead the column to the rear of the
Kissieberg by the wagon-track which leaves the Steynsburg road at
Roberts' homestead, and after crossing the Bamboosberg Spruit and the
colliery branch line, strikes, near Van Zyl's house, the track by
which General Gatacre had intended to approach the enemy's position.
The distance still to be traversed was, as will also be noticed, not
one and a half, but about two and a half miles. Moreover, after
crossing the spruit and the railway, the track traverses the northern
slopes of a stony irregular underfeature which guards the approaches
to the Kissieberg from the south and west. Progress over this ground
was unlikely to be rapid. Roberts' homestead is 10-1/2 miles from
Molteno. The troops had, therefore, already marched rather further
than was originally anticipated; and, as they had halted for a short
time every hour, their rate of marching had been fast for night-work
over such country. The men were somewhat weary owing to the march.
They were out of condition. They had been engaged on heavy fatigue
work on the morning of the 9th. Whether, therefore, the guides had
missed the true road in the dark, a supposition which is favoured by
the fact that they had previously assured the General that the whole
route was fit and easy for wheeled transport, or whether, not
realising the importance in military operations of obedience to
orders, they had, on their own judgment, diverted the column to the
longer route in the belief that it would be easier, the effect on the
General's