d be no war, and in this sense he
instructed Lyons. The latter, less expectant of peaceful separation, and
more aware of the latent power of the North, maintained throughout his
entire service at Washington that there was at least a _chance_ that the
North could subdue the South by might of arms[71], but he also, looking
to British interests, saw his early duty, before war broke, in cautious
suggestions against forcible Northern action. Thus from January to
March, 1861, British effort and indirect advice were based on the hope
that British trade interests might escape the tribulations inevitable
from a civil conflict in America. Beyond that point there was no grasp
of the complications likely to arise in case of war, and no clear
formulation of British policy[72].

In fact up to the middle of March, 1861, both public and official
British opinion discounted armed conflict, or at least any determined
Northern effort to recover the South. Early British attitude was,
therefore, based on a misconception. As this became clear, public
opinion began to break from a united humanitarian pro-Northern sentiment
and to show, in some quarters, quite another face. Even as early as
January the _Economist_ expressed wonder that the Northern States had
not availed themselves gladly of the chance to "shake off such an
incubus, and to purify themselves of such a stain[73]." and a month
later professed to believe that Great Britain would willingly permit the
North to secure compensation for loss of territory by annexing
Canada--provided the Canadians themselves desired it. This, it was
argued, would directly benefit England herself by cutting down military
expenditures[74]. The _London Press_ indulged in similar speculation,
though from the angle of a Canadian annexation of the Northern States,
whose more sober citizens must by now be weary of the sham of American
democracy, and disgusted with the rowdyism of political elections, which
"combine the morals of a horse race, the manners of a dog fight, the
passions of a tap-room, and the emotions of a gambling house[75]."
Probably such suggestions had little real purpose or meaning at the
moment, but it is interesting that this idea of a "compensation" in
Canada should have been voiced thus early. Even in the United States the
same thought had occurred to a few political leaders. Charles Sumner
held it, though too wise, politically, to advance it in the face of the
growing Northern determinati