gards the latter point in particular, it certainly appeared
that the most simple, if not the only way, would be to
recognize the Southern Confederacy[98]."
This was plain speaking, and Lyons' threat of recognizing the South did
not at the moment stir Seward to any retort. But five days later, on
March 25, Lyons gave a dinner to Seward and a number of the foreign
Ministers, and there Seward's violent talk about seizing any and all
ships that tried to trade with the South, even if there was no blockade,
made Lyons very anxious. As a host he diverted the conversation lest it
become too acrimonious, but he himself told Seward
"... that it was really a matter so very serious that I was
unwilling to discuss it; that his plan seemed to me to amount
in fact to a paper blockade of the enormous extent of coast
comprised in the seceding States; that the calling it an
enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to increase
the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in
the dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation or of
submitting to the interruption of their commerce[99]."
Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should be given the Southern
Commissioners when they arrived in London, but that they be treated
well. This, he thought, might open Seward's eyes to his folly. Still
Lyons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be so vigorous as his
language seemed to imply, and on March 29 he wrote that "prudent
counsels" were in the ascendant, that there would be no interference
with trade "_at present_," and that a quieter tone was everywhere
perceptible in Washington[100].
From the point of view of the British Minister at Washington, the
danger spot in relations between the United States and Great Britain lay
in this matter of interference with trade to Southern ports. Naturally,
and as in duty bound, he sought to preserve that trade. At first,
indeed, he seems to have thought that even though a civil war really
ensued the trade might continue uninterrupted. Certainly he bore hard
and constantly on this one point, seeking to influence not only
officials at Washington but the public press. Thus, in a letter to Bunch
dated April 12, 1861, at a time when he knew that W.H. Russell, the
_Times_ correspondent, would shortly appear in Charleston, he instructed
Bunch to remember that in talking to Russell he must especially impress
him with the idea that
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