from the minds of the higher quadrupeds, for no intelligible meaning
can be discovered in it; we should have to fall back on a miscarriage, and
to set up this miscarriage as the mother of all men, and without a
legitimate father. Such are the wanderings of a wrong method of thought,
even if it struts about in kingly robes.

Above all things we must settle what we are really to understand by the
mind of the higher quadrupeds as distinguished from the human mind. What
is there lacking in these animal minds to make them human? And what do
they possess, or what are they, that they should claim equal birth with
man? How much obscurity there is in these matters among the best animal
psychologists is seen when, for instance, we compare the assertions of
Romanes with those of Lloyd Morgan. While the former sets up a natural
genesis of the human mind from animal mind as being indisputable and as
not being thinkable in any other way, the latter, his greatest admirer,
says, "Believing, as I do, that conception is beyond the power of my
favourite and clever dog, I am forced to believe that his mind differs
generically from my own."(44) Undoubtedly by "generically" is meant,
according to his genus or his genesis. But in spite of this, the same
savant says in another place, that he cannot allow that there is a
difference _in kind_, that is _in genere_, between the human mind and the
mind of a dog. If men would only define their words, such contradictions
would in time become impossible.

What men and animals have in common is the Self, and this so-called Self
consists first of all in perception. This perception belongs, as has been
said, to those things which are given us, and not to those which can be
explained. It is a property of the eternal Self, as of light, to shine, to
illumine itself, that is, to know. Its knowing is its being, and its being
is its knowing, or its self-consciousness. If we take the Self as we find
it, not merely in itself, but embodied, we must attribute to it, besides
its own self-consciousness, a consciousness of the conditions of the body;
but of course we must not imagine that we can make this embodiment in any
way conceivable to us. It _is_ so--that is all that we can say, just as in
an earlier consideration of the embodiment and multiplication of the
eternal Logos we had to accept this as a datum, without being able to come
any nearer to the fact by conceptions, or even by mere analogies. This is
where