er the same general
concepts, and mark them by the same vocal signs. What we call derivative
forms, such as _deva_ besides _div_, are originally varieties in the
formation of words, that in time proved useful, and through repeated
employment obtained their special application. Often, too, there are real
compounds, just as the German _bar_ in _fruchtbar_, _furchtbar_, etc., was
originally the same word that we have in _Bahre_ (bier), but was very
different from _bar_ in _Nachbar_ (neighbour), which in spite of the
similarity in sound comes from an entirely different root, seen in _bauen_
(build), _bebauen_ (cultivate), _bauer_ (peasant), and in the English
neighbour.
If we have the ideas and the words, the process of thought, as Hobbes has
taught us, is nothing but an addition and subtraction of ideas. We add
when we say, A is B; when we say, for instance, man, or Caius, is mortal,
adding Caius, or man, to all that we call mortal; we subtract when we say,
A is not B; that is, when we abstract Enoch from all that we call mortal.
Everything that man has ever thought, humiliating as it may sound,
consists in these two operations; just as the most abstruse operations of
mathematics go back in the end to addition and subtraction. To what else
could they go back? Whether these mental operations are true or false, is
another question, with which the method of the thinker has nothing to do;
any more than formal logic inquires whether all men are mortal, but only
infers on the basis of these premises that Caius, because he is a man, is
also mortal.
We see, therefore, how language and thought go hand in hand; where there
is as yet no word, there is not yet an idea. The thinking capacity of the
mind has its source in language, lives in language, and develops
continuously in language. The human mind is human language, and as animals
possess no language, they do not _ipso facto_ possess what philosophers
understand by mind. We need not for this reason ascribe any special
faculty to men. Speech and thought are only a wider development of the
faculty of presentation such as an animal may have; but in an animal it
never develops any farther, for an animal has no general ideas; it remains
at the individual, and never attains unity in plurality. It knows, as
Plato would say, a horse, but not "horsedom." If we wish to say that the
perceiving self is present in animals as in men, there is no objection,
though in all such, questions relat
|