s, the modes in which it affects us, or the
phenomena which it produces--(pp. 9--11).

The doctrine of Relativity, as held by Kant and his many followers, is
next distinguished from the same doctrine as held by Hartley, James
Mill, Professor Bain, &c., compatible with either acceptance or
rejection of the Berkeleian theory. Kant maintains that the attributes
which we ascribe to outward things, or which are inseparable from them
in thought, contain additional elements over and above sensations _plus_
an unknowable cause--additional elements added by the mind itself, and
therefore still only relative, but constituting the original furniture
of the mind itself--inherent laws, partly of our sensitive, partly of
our intellectual faculty. It is on this latter point that Hartley and
those going along with him diverge. Admitting the same additional
elements, these philosophers do not ascribe to the mind any innate forms
to account for them, but hold that place, extension, substance, cause,
and the rest, &c., are conceptions put together out of ideas of
sensation, by the known laws of Association--(pp. 12--14).

Partial Relativity is the opinion professed by most philosophers (and by
most persons who do not philosophize). They hold that we know things
partly as they are in themselves, partly as they are merely in relation
to us.

This discrimination of the various schools of philosophers is highly
instructive, and is given with the full perspicuity belonging to Mr
Mill's style. He proceeds to examine in what sense Sir W. Hamilton
maintained the Relativity of Human Knowledge. He cites passages both
from the 'Discussions on Philosophy' and from the Lectures, in which
that doctrine is both affirmed in its greatest amplitude, and enunciated
in the most emphatic language--(pp. 17, 18, 22, 23). But he also
produces extracts from the most elaborate of Sir W. Hamilton's
'Dissertations on Reid,' in which a doctrine quite different and
inconsistent is proclaimed--that our knowledge is only partially, not
wholly, relative; that the secondary qualities of matter, indeed, are
known to us only relatively, but that the primary qualities are known to
us as they are in themselves, or as they exist objectively, and that
they may be even evolved by demonstration _a priori_--(pp. 19-26, 30).
The inconsistency between the two doctrines, professed at different
times, and in different works, by Sir W. Hamilton, is certainly
manifest. Mr Mill is of