never know that we are able to do a thing, except from
having done it, or something similar to it. Having acted, we
know, as far as that experience reaches, how we are able to
act; _and this knowledge, when it has become familiar, is
often confounded with, and called by, the name of
consciousness._ But it does not derive any increase of
authority from being misnamed: its truth is not supreme
over, but depends upon, experience. If our so-called
consciousness is not borne out by experience, it is a
delusion. It has no title to credence, but as an
interpretation of experience; and if it is a false
interpretation, it must give way.'--pp. 503, 504
After this salutary and much-needed warning against the confusion
between consciousness as an infallible authority, and belief upon
experience, of which we are conscious as a belief--Mr Mill proceeds to
sift the alleged self-evident connection between Free-will and
Accountability. He shows, not merely that there is no connection, but
that there is a positive repugnance, between the two. By Free-will is
meant that a volition is not determined by motives, but is a spontaneous
mental fact, neither having a cause, nor admitting of being predicted.
Now, the very reason for giving notice that we intend to punish certain
acts, and for inflicting punishment if the acts be committed, is, that
we trust in the efficacy of the threat and the punishment as deterring
motives. If the volition of agents be not influenced by motives, the
whole machinery of law becomes unavailing, and punishment a purposeless
infliction of pain. In fact, it is on that very ground that the madman
is exempted from punishment; his volition being presumed to be not
capable of being acted upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction.
The _free_ agent, thus understood, is one who can neither feel himself
accountable, nor be rendered accountable, to or by others. It is only
the _necessary_ agent (the person whose volitions are determined by
motives, and, in case of conflict, by the strongest desire or the
strongest apprehension) that can be held really accountable, or can
feel himself to be so.
'The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions (says
Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in opposition both to pure and
to modified Fatalism, that not only our conduct, but our
character, is in part amenable to our will: that we can, by
employing t
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